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Abstract
Does power-sharing drive corruption in post-conflict countries? We conceptualize
government elites in any post-conflict situation as rent-seeking agents who need to ensure
the support of their key constituencies to remain in power. Power-sharing institutions—
especially cabinet-level, executive power-sharing institutions—systematically shape these
rent-seeking motives. Power-sharing cabinets create political coalitions dominated by
small circles of government and rebel elites with direct access to state resources and low
levels of loyalty towards the government leader. Also, the provisional nature of many
power-sharing institutions increases rent-seeking incentives: facing a limited time horizon
in office, rent-seeking elites within the power-sharing coalition are likely to capture as
many rents as possible before they have to leave office. Thus, post-conflict countries
with power-sharing institutions should exhibit higher aggregated levels of rent-seeking
measured as the level of corruption in a country. Using statistical time-series cross-sectional
analysis of post-conflict situations between 1996 and 2010, we find that power-sharing
cabinets substantively increase corruption in post-conflict countries and that this effect
is stronger in the presence of natural resource rents. These findings add quantitative
evidence to the debate about drivers of post-conflict corruption. Moreover, they highlight
a trade-off between short-term stability and long-term negative effects of corruption for
post-conflict political and economic development.
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1 Introduction
Systemic corruption is an endemic problem in countries emerging from violent conflict (Cheng
& Zaum, 2013; Lindberg & Orjuela, 2014). Higher corruption is negatively related to the
quality of post-conflict peace (Global Peace Index, 2015), it increases the risk of renewed ethnic
conflict (Neudorfer & Theuerkauf, 2014) and is generally assumed to have negative effects on
long-term economic development (Aidt, 2003). The weakly institutionalized environments of
many contemporary post-conflict states are an ideal breeding ground for practices that allow
the use of public office for private gain—the common definition of corruption that we follow
(Svensson, 2005). Given this substantive significance of corruption in post-conflict situations,
we observe a surprisingly wide variation in corruption across post-conflict states. Although all
post-conflict countries score, on average, lower on corruption indices than countries without
a history of violent conflict, there are stark differences in the level of corruption within the
group of post-conflict countries. States such as Rwanda, Peru, or Croatia are less affected by
systematic bribery, patronage, and clientelism than, for instance, the Democratic Republic of
the Congo or Liberia. What accounts for this variation?
We argue that one of the main drivers of systematic post-conflict corruption is the presence
of political power-sharing institutions in a country. We conceptualize government elites in any
post-conflict situation as individual rent-seeking agents that need to ensure the support of their
key constituencies to remain in power (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003).
We expect power-sharing institutions—particularly cabinet-level, executive power-sharing
institutions—to systematically shape these rent-seeking motives. Power-sharing cabinets create
political coalitions dominated by small circles of government and rebel elites with direct
access to state resources and low levels of loyalty towards the government leader (Bueno
de Mesquita et al., 2003). Also, the provisional nature of many power-sharing institutions
increases rent-seeking incentives: facing a limited time horizon in office, rent-seeking elites
within the power-sharing coalition are likely to capture as many rents as possible before they
have to leave office (Levi, 1989). Based on this logic, we argue that post-conflict countries
with power-sharing institutions are on average associated with higher aggregate levels of
rent-seeking conceptualized and measured as the overall level of corruption in a country. We
also suspect that power-sharing institutions are more likely to increase corruption when there
are higher levels of resources that are easy to capture, such as natural resources or foreign aid.
We test these predictions with a statistical time-series cross-sectional analysis of post-
conflict situations between 1996 and 2010. Our dependent variable measures the extent of
corruption in a country using data from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann,
Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010). We rely on the Power-Sharing Event Dataset (PSED) (Ottmann
& Vüllers, 2015) to capture the practices of executive power-sharing in the aftermath of
negotiated settlements. In contrast to the large majority of existing data collections on power-
sharing, PSED moves beyond the coding of the mere promises of power-sharing found in
peace agreements. Instead, PSED explicitly records whether and when power-sharing between
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the government and former rebels has taken place in a post-conflict period and when it was
abolished again. PSED therefore provides us with time-variant data on actual rebel access to
state resources. Consistent with our predictions, we find empirical support for our hypothesis
that executive power-sharing increases the level of corruption in a post-conflict country. Our
analysis also finds this rent-seeking behavior to be more pronounced in countries with higher
levels of natural resource wealth. Our empirical results are robust to a range of alternative
model specifications and treatment selection models that account for the endogenous selection
of power-sharing governments.
This article makes several notable contributions. First, we advance the literature on power-
sharing after civil conflict. By exploring the relationship between executive power-sharing
and corruption using new data on the implementation and duration of these arrangements
(Ottmann & Vüllers, 2015), we shed light on the mechanisms through which power-sharing
works. Most scholars and practitioners assume that power-sharing functions by mitigating
commitment problems (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007). We identify a specific channel through
which such commitment may be secured: the buying off of violent actors and the distribution
of spoils from the state. We also add quantitative evidence to the largely case-study based
research on post-conflict corruption (Cheng & Zaum, 2013; Lindberg & Orjuela, 2014). By
statistically isolating the effect of power-sharing on corruption, we identify a major driver of
corruption in post-conflict settings beyond single cases.
Second, we make a more general contribution to the broader study of the institutional
determinants of corruption in developing countries. In this line of research, scholars typi-
cally investigate the long-term effects of structural changes in key institutions—such as the
democratization of political institutions or improvements to the rule of law—on corruption
(Billger & Goel, 2009; Iwasaki & Suzuki, 2012; Jetter, Agudelo, & Hassan, 2015). Taking
this research further, we focus on an important subset of countries in the developing world,
post-conflict countries, and show that even short-lived transitional power-sharing institutions
in these countries can have a substantial effect on levels of corruption.
These academic contributions enable us to inject new empirical evidence into a critical
policy debate. Notwithstanding its mixed track record (Binningsbø, 2013), power-sharing
remains a popular conflict-resolution method for policy-makers at the United Nations and
foreign ministries around the world. Most recently, it has been discussed as a key element of a
prospective negotiated settlement to the Syrian conflict (Groarke, 2016). Executive power-
sharing was also central in the recently failed peace agreement in South Sudan (Kindersley
& Rolandsen, 2016). But our findings highlight an inconvenient trade-off inherent to these
arrangements. Power-sharing between government and rebels might be necessary to halt
continued bloodshed. At the same time, power-sharing is also a main driver of corruption in
post-conflict countries. While this corruption might be a necessary element of securing the
peace, it threatens the long-term perspectives of post-conflict countries. Policy-makers should
therefore focus not only on how to design successful power-sharing deals but on also how
a country can transition away from power-sharing once the risk of civil war recurrence has
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substantially subsided.
2 Corruption in Post-Conflict Countries
Scholars and practitioners increasingly recognize corruption as one of the key challenges faced
by countries emerging from violent conflict (Cheng & Zaum, 2013; Lindberg & Orjuela, 2014;
Transparency International, 2014; Working Group on Corruption and Security, 2014). This
recognition builds on the insight that post-conflict countries are, on average, more corrupt
than countries not affected by conflict (see left panel in Figure 1). Typically, the effects
of corruption in post-conflict contexts are characterized as a trade-off between short-term
stability and long-term negative effects on political and economic development (Cheng &
Zaum, 2013; Lindberg & Orjuela, 2014). Cheng and Zaum (2013, p. 10) observe that “[w]hen
the proceeds of corruption flow through [patronage] networks during a period of political
instability, then these funds can be used to cement loyalties and relationships which can,
in turn, help to stabilize the emerging post-war order.” These expectations are in line with
the more general finding that elites in corrupt countries can use oil rents to “buy peace” by
co-opting regime opponents (Fjelde & Soysa, 2009). In the long-term, however, rampant
corruption can deepen inter-group mistrust, particularly if one societal group is perceived to
benefit more from corruption than any other group. Citing evidence from Sri Lanka, Orjuela
(2014, p. 760) reports substantial differences in corruption perceptions across ethnic groups.
This finding is echoed by quantitative evidence showing corruption to be a driver of ethnic civil
war onset (Neudorfer & Theuerkauf, 2014). More generally, the negative long-term effects of
corruption in post-conflict countries stems from the insight that corruption hampers economic
growth (d’Agostino, Dunne, & Pieroni, 2016; Serritzlew, Sønderskov, & Svendsen, 2014) and
democratic development (Fukuyama, 2014, ch. 5; Warren, 2004), by entrenching established
elites and their patronage networks.
These effects are particularly interesting since we observe much variation in the degree
of corruption across post-conflict countries (see the right panel in Figure 1). One potential
driver of corruption is the influence of natural resource abundance on corruption in certain
post-conflict contexts. Billon (2014) argues that natural resources, such as oil, diamonds,
timber, or coal can feed post-conflict corruption, but this relationship is mediated by the
quality of existing institutions and socio-economic inequalities (see also Rustad, Lujala, and
Le Billon, 2012). This insight is linked to quantitative evidence on the conditional effect of
resource income on democracy and conflict in the context of high-quality and/or high-capacity
institutions (Basedau & Lay, 2009; Dunning, 2008; Ross, 2015).
Another variable that features prominently in the studies on drivers of post-conflict corrup-
tion is international engagement, particularly the sudden inflow of foreign aid and its impact
on corruption. Aid in post-conflict contexts, argues von Billerbeck (2013, p. 82), implies a
“sudden availability of rents, combined with [...] distorted economic conditions [that] makes
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Figure 1. Corruption in (Non-)Post-Conflict Countries in Comparison
Note: Lower values on the World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index indicate higher corruption. Solid lines in the
left panels indicate group means. Data Source: (World Governance Indicators, 2015), authors’ graphic. For details
on the sample of post-conflict countries, see below.
post-conflict settings rife with opportunities for corruption.” In 2008, for instance, aid to
post-conflict Liberia peaked at almost 200 percent of the national gross-domestic product,
dwarfing the local economy. But it is not only reconstruction and humanitarian aid inflows
that increase opportunities for corruption. The deployment of large-scale peace operations,
too, is often accompanied by the establishment of a “peacekeeping economy” that not only
exceeds the conflict-ridden national economy by orders of magnitude, but also provides a
multitude of opportunities for corruption for both national and international personnel (cf.
Cheng and Zaum, 2013, p. 13; see also, for instance, Beber, Gilligan, Guardado, and Karim,
2017 on transactional sex between UN peacekeepers and the local population).
Besides natural resources and international involvement, other causes of post-conflict
corruption remain under-researched and at the level of scattered single case studies or anecdotal
evidence. One variable often mentioned in this context is power-sharing arrangements, that
is institutions that incorporate former battlefield adversaries (or, more precisely, their elites)
in joint formal political institutions, such as the cabinet or territorial autonomy structures
(Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007). As Cheng and Zaum (2013, p. 8) posit, “in some post-conflict
settlements, it has been the opportunities for corruption and patronage that were negotiated as
part of the power-sharing agreements that have literally helped to ’buy out’ potential spoilers
in a conflict.” This observation is bolstered by qualitative evidence of a positive relationship
between power-sharing and corruption from countries such as Liberia (Reno, 2013), the
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Democratic Republic of the Congo (Wolters & Kaiser, 2013), Bosnia and Herzegovina (Belloni
& Strazzari, 2014), or Aceh in Indonesia (Aspinall, 2009).
Given the substantive research program on power-sharing institutions, it is notable, how-
ever, that no systematic, quantitative evidence exists as to whether or not power-sharing
arrangements indeed drive post-conflict corruption. Most scholars regard power-sharing pri-
marily as a tool to end protracted violent conflict between the government of a state and
rebel groups (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007; Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008; Walter, 2002). Building
on bargaining theory (Fearon, 1995; Walter, 2002), researchers argue that power-sharing
provides an institutional framework that allows governments as well as rebels to overcome
their security dilemma and credibly commit to a peace deal without fearing the defection
of the other side. However, empirical research on the relationship between power-sharing
on the one hand and conflict management and democratization on the other has brought
about contradictory results. Some find empirical support for a relationship between these
factors (Norris, 2008) while others do not (Horowitz, 1985). Likewise, some scholars present
evidence for a violence-reducing and democracy-enhancing effect of power-sharing (Hartzell
& Hoddie, 2007, 2015), while others argue against such a relationship (Jarstad, 2008; Tull &
Mehler, 2005). None of these studies, however, address the question of whether and under
which circumstances power-sharing institutions systematically shape the extent of post-conflict
corruption.
3 The Political Economy of Power-Sharing
Our argument about the relationship between power-sharing and corruption starts from the
general observation that government elites are the central political actors in all post-conflict
situations—regardless of whether a power-sharing arrangement is implemented or not. We
conceptualize these elites as rent-seeking agents who use public political office to generate
private income (Krueger, 1974). However, corrupt or rent-seeking behavior serves the purpose
not only of maximizing the purely private economic benefits of political leaders, but also of
maximizing their private political benefits: rents from political office provide political leaders
with the financial means to stay in power (Acemoglu, Verdier, & Robinson, 2004; Bueno de
Mesquita et al., 2003). Politicians, in this view, distribute public funds from taxes, natural
resources, and foreign aid through patronage networks to buy political support from key
constituencies, whose backing is essential for leaders to stay in office.
The assumption of rent-seeking government elites is based on scholarship about the
political economy of historical state development—a situation very similar to contemporary
statebuilding processes in post-conflict situations (Bates, 2008; Herbst, 2000; North, Wallis, &
Weingast, 2009). A stylized and condensed version of the argument in the state development
literature about the relationship between government elites and rent-seeking goes as follows:
Political order in the form of states provides elites with a mechanism to generate rents from
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taxation. In turn, internal violent conflict decreases returns from rents because it negatively
affects production. Therefore, elites form dominant coalitions—governments—to limit violence
between their respective groups and ensure rent generation. In this process, elites become
“stationary bandits” (Olson, 1993) of a different sort, providing basic state functions as state
agents in exchange for the opportunity to receive tax income (North et al., 2009; North, Wallis,
Webb, & Weingast, 2012).
In a post-conflict situation, the rent-seeking behavior of government elites also assumes
such a central role due to another core feature of post-conflict politics: the elite-constituency
relationship between former conflict actors and their support groups. Although the relationship
between political elites and their political support networks is a central feature of any political
system (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003), it is particularly pronounced in post-conflict settings.
Whereas in all political systems elites rely on their constituencies to ensure their political
survival, in post-conflict settings elites rely on constituency support for political and physical
survival. Post-conflict settings are inherently unstable and elites cannot be certain that conflict
will not recur (Walter, 2009). If they lose the support of their political networks, they are
unlikely to be able to mobilize enough resources to survive the resurgence of conflict. Thus,
government elites depend critically on their constituencies which provided the necessary
recruits and political and material support during the conflict (Kalyvas, 2006; Ottmann, 2017).
These constituencies also form the electorate of the related political parties in peace times
(Utas, 2012).
We understand this selective resource allocation in post-conflict countries in close reference
to political patronage as the politically motivated distribution of selected private benefits to
relevant constituencies by political elites (Erdmann & Engel, 2007). These resources can take
the form of public infrastructure investments, such as electrification, the building of road
networks, construction, the implementation of foreign aid projects, or any other public service.
However, such preferential resource allocation is rarely directly observable. We therefore
focus on the general level of rent-seeking in a society—namely the extent to which a society
is able to control corruption. Corruption is defined as the “misuse of public office for private
gain” (Svensson, 2005, p. 207). The term therefore subsumes these allocation procedures, but
remains on a more general level.
Why should power-sharing institutions increase elite corruption? Post-conflict power-
sharing establishes rules mandating joint control of power and sets up institutions dividing
power between the involved actors. Power-sharing thus defines the shape of the dominant
coalition elites can build to limit violence between them and ensure their privileged access to
rents (North et al., 2009; North et al., 2012). This is especially the case when power-sharing
takes place on a national executive level. In this form of power-sharing, rebel representatives are
explicitly granted seats in a joint government cabinet, typically in the context of a transitional
“grand coalition.” These executive power-sharing governments promote elites’ rent-seeking
behavior and the subsequent selective distribution of rents to their constituencies in three
distinct ways.
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First, executive power-sharing arrangements restrict membership to the small circle of
government and rebel elites who have signed the peace agreement and deliberately exclude
all other elites and social groups (Jarstad, 2008; Ottmann & Vüllers, 2015). At least until the
first national elections these signatories have agreed upon, this coalition cannot be enlarged
without threatening the stability of the settlement and a return to full-scale civil war (Reilly,
2008). While executive power-sharing arrangements might increase the overall number of
cabinet positions in a national government, empirical studies indicate that executive power-
sharing does not necessarily equate with an enlargement of the overall winning coalition (Joshi
& Mason, 2011; Roeder & Rothchild, 2005).1 It is therefore safe to assume that executive
power-sharing merely replaces government elites with rebel elites. Executive power-sharing
thus creates (or simply maintains) what is called a small winning coalition in the literature
(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003) by effectively preventing other elites and larger segments
of the population from participating in government.2 Generally, a winning coalition is the
subset of a country’s selectorate able to provide the necessary support to maintain the leader’s
rule over the larger selectorate and disenfranchised members of the society. In exchange
for support, the leader distributes private and public goods to the members of the winning
coalition. In winning coalitions composed of large sections of the selectorate, it is too costly
to dole out private benefits. Leaders therefore reduce the provision of private goods in favor
of providing public goods for the wider selectorate. In small winning coalitions, however, it
is cheaper to distribute private benefits to the members which, in turn, allows these elites to
engage in corrupt behavior. As countries with power-sharing governments solidify a small
winning coalition by restricting access to political power for all groups outside the agreement,
these countries should also see an increase in corruption.
Second, the rebel elites in a power-sharing government have only recently stopped fighting
the incumbent leadership. Trust between the former adversaries will therefore understandably
be low (Walter, 2009). Both sides often also still possess the outside option of resorting to
arms again should they feel that the peace agreement does not serve their interests. That is,
they do not depend critically on the incumbent leader but could instead try again to depose
him or her. Executive power-sharing therefore creates winning coalitions with elites who have
relatively low levels of loyalty towards the government leader. Scholars understand loyalty
as the extent to which elites have the opportunity to successfully switch their allegiance to a
challenger putting together a competing winning coalition (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).
Elites who do not have this option to defect are fiercely loyal to the incumbent leader as they
face the risk of losing their privileged access to rents should they be excluded from the winning
1While not the focus of this study, it might nevertheless be worthwhile to further probe the impact of executive
power-sharing on the size of winning coalitions in future research. For example, it could be possible that such
power-sharing arrangements do not enlarge the winning coalition per se but rather the increase the number of
clients who elites in the winning coalition have to accommodate. In such a case, we would probably also see an
increase in elite corruption.
2In essence, power-sharing governments formalize what North et al. (2012) have called a “Limited Access
Order:” they limit the access of other social groups to the governing coalition—the power-sharing coalition between
rebels and the government—thus creating material benefits in the form of rents from the state for the participating
elites and their clients.
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coalition. Knowing this, the leader can afford to offer fewer private benefits to these elites
(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, p. 66). Executive power-sharing arrangements, however,
replace some of these highly loyal elites with less loyal rebels. To counter these low levels of
loyalty, the incumbent leadership has to pay a higher price and provide more private benefits
to rebel elites to keep them within the winning coalition.
Finally, executive power-sharing creates a limited time horizon for rent-seeking elites.
Executive power-sharing arrangements are often temporally limited, because transitional gov-
ernments are replaced by elected governments (Schmidt & Galyan, 2016). Rebel participation
in power-sharing is largely a function of their strength on the battlefield (or at least their ability
to inflict costs on the government). It is not necessarily a result of their popular support, and
thus electoral success is uncertain. Rational elites facing the strong possibility of a temporal
limit in office discount the future more steeply (Levi, 1989). Facing uncertainty over their
involvement in the future government once power-sharing ends or, worse, the possibility of
renewed violence if the other side reneges on the agreement, rebel and government elites
become what Mancur Olson has famously labeled “roving bandits”—that is rulers who are not
concerned with the future welfare of their citizens, but who prey on these citizens instead:
“when an autocrat has no reason to consider the future output of the society at all, his incen-
tives are those of a roving bandit and that is what he becomes” (Olson, 1993, p. 571). This
discounting of the future is echoed by Bates, Greif, and Singh (2002, p. 621) (see also Bates,
2008): “in the early stages of democratization, an increase in uncertainty for incumbent elites
can be expected to bring, ceteris paribus, increased levels of political predation.” Thus, the
limited time horizon of power-sharing arrangements further increases elites’ incentives to
engage in short-term, private rent-seeking behavior.
Against this background of small winning coalitions with rebel elites who exhibit low levels
of loyalty towards the leader and only have a limited time horizon, we expect that executive
power-sharing arrangements should be associated with higher levels of corruption.
Hypothesis 1: Executive power-sharing in post-conflict countries increases the level of corruption.
The impact of executive power-sharing on elite corruption is moderated by the level and
type of resources available to elites. First and foremost, a leader draws on government revenue
generated through taxation. But this is not the only source of government income. Leaders
can also rely on revenue generated from natural resources and foreign aid. Bueno de Mesquita
and Smith (2009) regard such non-tax government income as “free resources” that are easy
to capture: They do not require citizens to participate in the economy and, consequently, the
government does not have to provide public goods to the population in order to facilitate their
exploitation. If a post-conflict power-sharing government has access to more resources that
elites can capture more easily, we consequently expect elites to be engaged in higher levels of
corruption.
Rents from natural resources can be captured more easily than foreign aid, because they are
highly fungible, not attached to political conditions, and typically more constant than foreign
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aid (Altincekic & Bearce, 2014). Resource rents provide political elites with a source of windfall
revenues that substitute for government income obtained via taxation of the population. Since
governments with access to non-tax income do not rely on taxing their population they have
reduced incentives to respond to their citizens’ needs. This allows elites to distribute non-
tax government income through patronage networks instead of publicly investing in socially
beneficial outcomes (Ahmadov, 2014; Djankov, Montalvo, & Reynal-Querol, 2008; Dunning,
2008; Ross, 2004). That means that elites in power-sharing arrangements with access to high
levels of natural resource income have access to more resources overall, which, in turn, enables
them to direct and implement more preferential policies.
Hypothesis 2: The larger the windfall gains from natural resources in a post-conflict country,
the stronger the positive relationship between power-sharing and corruption.
We also regard foreign aid as a source of non-tax government income.3 This holds true
both for more fungible types of aid such as budget support or debt relief as well as for more
sector-specific projects, such as the provision of health services, infrastructure projects, or
technical cooperation on agricultural support. Fungible aid allows elites to capture aid money
more easily and divert it to their patronage networks, through salaries, jobs or simply bribes
(Svensson, 2000). Specific aid projects are much more difficult to capture directly. But they do
require an allocation decision which elites will try to influence in order to steer more valuable
projects to the regions on whose political support they rely to stay in power (Hodler & Raschky,
2014). In addition, higher aid flows typically indicate the presence of numerous donors.
If many donors compete over the policy concessions of the recipient, rent-seeking recipient
government elites—such as elites in power-sharing governments—can reap the surplus benefits
of such donor competition for their own political purposes (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2016).
Hypothesis 3: The larger the windfall gains from international aid in a post-conflict country,
the stronger the positive relationship between power-sharing and corruption.
4 Data
To test these hypotheses we turn to a statistical analysis. The unit of analysis is the post-conflict
country in a given year. We start out by constructing a sample of the country-years after
civil war as recorded by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) between 1990 and 2010
(Themnér & Wallensteen, 2013).4 We restrict our sample to the first five post-conflict years,
given the data limitations of our power-sharing variable (see below) and the convention in
the literature.5 For any given country-year to be included in our sample there have to be at
3Following the general definition, we understand foreign aid not only as financial aid, but also as technical trans-
fers in the form of loans, grants, or equity investments by governments (or their aid agencies), inter-governmental
organizations and private foundations (cf. Tierney et al., 2011).
4UCDP defines civil war as a “contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the
use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25
battle-related deaths” (Themnér & Wallensteen, 2013).
5For a similar approach, see Binningsbø, Loyle, Gates, and Elster (2012)
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least two consecutive years of no armed conflict.6 This ensures a minimum of post-conflict
development and excludes one-year post-conflict periods, which typically indicate a cessation
of hostilities, but not necessarily the end of the conflict. Because our dependent variable is only
available for 1996 and later, we also exclude all country-years prior to 1996. These selection
criteria result in 70 distinct post-conflict periods in 51 countries.7
To measure corruption, we include data on the level of corruption in a post-conflict country
in a given year. Corruption can take many different forms, including vote-buying, preferential
policy treatment, or the clientelistic distribution of public offices (Svensson, 2000; van de Walle,
2001). However, data on these phenomena is scarce, since they typically do not take place in
the open. We therefore measure corruption using the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)
(Kaufmann et al., 2010), which aggregate expert opinions on corruption levels in a country.
The WGI measure Control of Corruption “captures perceptions of the extent to which public
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well
as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests” (World Governance Indicators, 2015,
p. 4). This measure is based on a wide variety of sources, predominantly expert assessments
of countries. The WGI quantifies these assessments. The Control of Corruption measure ranges
between -2.5 and 2.5 and measures a country’s level of corruption relative to the global average
in a given year. Mexico, for instance, has a value of -0.15 for 2003, whereas the Democratic
Republic of the Congo has a Control of Corruption score of -1.43 for 2003. This indicates that
both countries were more corrupt than the global average in 2003, but that the Democratic
Republic of Congo were substantially more corrupt than Mexico. Unfortunately, the Control of
Corruption measure is not available for all country-years in our sample. It starts with biannual
measures in 1996 and becomes available annually only from 2002.8
We rely on the Power-Sharing Event Dataset (PSED) to assess the impact of power-sharing
on the level of corruption in a post-conflict country (Ottmann & Vüllers, 2015). Among other
things, PSED includes detailed information on the type and timing of our central explanatory
variable, power-sharing on the national executive level. It records when the representatives
of a rebel signatory to a peace agreement joined the national government of the country
by taking over particular cabinet positions and when these rebel representatives left these
positions again. In doing so, PSED offers one of the first dynamic measures of government-rebel
power-sharing arrangements in the aftermath of civil wars. For our subsequent statistical
analysis, we construct a binary variable—Executive Power-Sharing—which takes the value of
“1” when former rebels have taken over positions in the national government in a given year.
6Unless this procedure resulted in a country-year in 2010 which we then included. An example of this is Sri
Lanka, where UCDP records a conflict in 2009, but not in 2010. Consequently, we include the country-year Sri
Lanka in 2010 in our sample, even though this period is not two years long.
7See Table 1 in the Online Appendix for a list of countries and post-conflict country-years included in our
analysis.
8We do not replace missing values in our empirical analysis. However, we test the robustness of our findings
using two strategies. First, we replace missing Control of Corruption values with the previous non-missing values.
Second, we replace missing values with a linear interpolation of Control of Corruption on year using Stata 14’s
ipolate command (StataCorp, 2015). The results do not change substantially and the findings remain robust.
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Table 1. Main Variables, Operationalization, and Data Sources
Variable Operationalization Data Source
Control of Corruption Score measuring a country’s level of corruption in
relation to the global average on a scale ranging
from -2.5 to 2.5.
Worldwide Governance
Indicators (Kaufmann,
Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010)
Executive Power-Sharing Binary variable taking the value of ‘1’ when a rebel
groups has taken over positions in the national
government after a peace agreement.
PSED (Ottmann & Vüllers,
2015)
Natural Resource Wealth A country’s share of natural resource rents as a
percentage of its national gross domestic product.
Data is log transformed.
World Development
Indicators (World Bank,
2015c)
Foreign Aid Income A country’s foreign aid income as per cent of
national gross domestic product. Data is log
transformed.
AidData Project (Tierney
et al., 2011)
GDP Per Capita A country’s gross domestic product divided by
midyear population in 2005 US dollar. Data is
log-transformed.
World Development
Indicators (World Bank,
2015a)
Polity2 A 21-point indicator ranking a country’s regime type
from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly
democratic).
Polity IV Project
(Marshall, Jaggers, &
Gurr, 2015)
Ethnic Fractionalization Herfindahl index of a country’s ethnic
fractionalization ranging from 0 to 1. The higher
the value, the more fractionalized a country, the
lower the value, the more ethnically homogeneous.
This variable is time-invariant.
Alesina, Devleeschauwer,
Easterly, Kurlat, and
Wacziarg, 2003
Population Midyear estimate of a country’s total population.
Data is log-transformed.
World Development
Indicators (World Bank,
2015b)
Table 2. Summary Statistics
Obs Mean SD Min Max
Control of Corruption 183 −0.82 0.41 −1.8 0.6
Executive Power-Sharing 183 0.19 0.39 0.0 1.0
Natural Resource Wealth (ln) 183 2.20 1.24 0.0 4.5
Foreign Aid Income (ln) 176 −2.42 1.26 −6.9 0.7
GDP Per Capita (ln) 178 7.03 0.96 5.3 9.4
Polity2 180 1.21 5.48 −9.0 9.0
Ethnic Fractionalization 181 0.59 0.25 0.0 0.9
Population (ln) 183 16.07 1.34 13.2 19.3
For all post-conflict years without such power-sharing, the binary variable takes the value of
“0.” Overall, there are 13 post-conflict countries with a total of 47 country-years with executive
power-sharing.
We also suggest that the effect of power-sharing on corruption should be stronger in the
context of resources that can be captured. We measure the level of resources available to the
power-sharing elites with two variables. First, we include a variable that captures the share
of natural resource rents as a percentage of the national gross domestic product: Natural
Resource Wealth. Natural resource rents are “the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents
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(hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest rents” (World Bank, 2015c). The idea behind this
measure is that natural resource rents are direct income to the state that—in contrast to tax
income, for instance—government elites can capture directly (Morrison, 2009). Second, we
include a measure of foreign aid flows. We utilize data from the AidData project and construct
the variable Foreign Aid Income, which captures aid income as a percentage of national GDP
(Tierney et al., 2011). Similarly to our measure of natural resource rents, our aid variable
captures non-tax income available to the government.
To account for potential confounding factors, we also include control variables in our
analysis. Past research indicates that more democratic countries show lower levels of corruption
(Chang & Golden, 2010; Kunicová & Rose-Ackerman, 2005; Montinola & Jackman, 2002). At
the same time, democracy and power-sharing might be related: power-sharing might obstruct
democratic accountability by obscuring political responsibility (Schedler, 1999; Tavits, 2007),9
while higher levels of democracy might be associated with a propensity for establishing power-
sharing governments. To isolate the effect of power-sharing from these effects of democratic
accountability, we therefore include the Polity2 score measuring the level of democracy in a
country. These scores are taken from the Polity IV Project (Marshall, Jaggers, & Gurr, 2015).
Further, ethnic fractionalization has been found to be negatively correlated with corruption
(Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, & Wacziarg, 2003), but we expect it to also be
positively associated with power-sharing (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2015). We therefore include
the Ethnic Fractionalization score from Alesina et al. (2003). We also expect countries with
higher GDP Per Capita to exhibit lower levels of corruption (Treisman, 2007, 236ff). Finally, we
control for the effect that foreign aid flows are systematically higher to countries with a smaller
population (Hoeffler & Outram, 2011). Table 1 provides information on the operationalization
and data source for each variables. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics.
5 Empirical Strategy
The objective of our statistical analysis is to estimate the effect of executive power-sharing on
the level of corruption in a post-conflict country. We therefore begin our empirical analysis
with a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model in the form of
CCi j = α+ β1PSi j + β2Resourcesi j + β3Aidi j + β4Controlsi j + εi j (1)
where Control of Corruption (CCi j) is predicted by our main variable of interest Executive
9Almost by definition, power-sharing undermines the separation of powers and therefore weakens horizontal
accountability (Lijphart, 1977). Similarly, post-conflict power-sharing arrangements are interim or transitional
arrangements which are not the result of electoral competition but agreed upon during peace negotiations (Schmidt
& Galyan, 2016). Only once interim arrangements end do national elections take place. Vertical accountability
in the form of elections is therefore also absent during this transition period. We are grateful to an anonymous
reviewer for highlighting this argument and discuss its implications for future research in the conclusion of this
paper.
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Power-Sharing (PSi j), and the variables Natural Resource Wealth (Resourcesi j) and Foreign
Aid Income (Aidi j). The vector of control variables Controlsi j serves to isolate the effect of
executive power-sharing from context factors previously found to be associated with the level
of corruption in a country.10
In the first stage of our empirical analysis, we begin with this basic regression model.
To explore potentially interactive relationship between executive power-sharing, non-tax
government income and corruption, we then add multiplicative interaction terms between
PSi j and Resourcesi j and Aidi j to our covariates. In the second stage of our empirical analysis,
we consider alternative model specifications of these three OLS regression models to assess the
robustness of our findings. Specifically, we investigate the concept validity of our dependent
variable and the effect of alternative explanatory factors. We use robust standard errors
clustered on the post-conflict country to account for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
The final stage of our empirical analysis addresses endogeneity concerns. Executive power-
sharing is likely not randomly allocated to post-conflict countries. Instead, power-sharing
could be the result of a strategic interaction between rebels and the government. For example,
endogeneity could occur because more corrupt countries may be more likely to adopt executive
power-sharing institutions (reverse causality) and/or unobserved factors might affect both
the adoption of power-sharing and determine the level of corruption in a country. Thus, the
coefficient estimate of interest β1 in Equation 1 might be biased. We estimate an endogenous
treatment regression model to address this issue. This type of model allows us to model the
exogenous selection of executive power-sharing empirically and account for the selection
effects in the outcome equation (Wooldridge, 2010). Specifically, the model estimates a linear
model for the outcome equation and an auxiliary probit model for the selection process of the
binary treatment variable. The information from the selection equation on the propensity of
treatment is then included in the outcome regression to compute consistent estimates of the
treatment variable. Because of the continuous nature of our dependent variable (Control of
Corruption), as well as the binary nature of our independent/treatment variable (Executive
Power-Sharing), this model is best suited for this type of analysis.
The endogenous treatment regression model is implemented using Stata 14’s etregress
command (StataCorp, 2013) and is a variant of the Heckman selection models (Heckman,
1979). This command fits two equations, one for the outcome CCi j and one for the treatment
PSi j:
10This logic follows the general advice by Angrist and Pischke (2009) that control variables make the conditional
independence assumption of a treatment (power-sharing) more credible. The control variables themselves, however,
are unlikely to have a causal interpretation, since we do not specifically control for other factors that might make
their interpretation causally credible.
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Outcome equation:
CCi j =α+ β1PSi j + β2Resourcesi j + β3Aidi j+
β4Controlsi j + εi j
Selection equation:
PS j =
1, if w j + u j0,otherwise
(2)
where PSi j represents the potentially endogenous treatment Executive Power-Sharing and
wi j are the covariates in the selection equation. The errors εi j and νi j are assumed to be
correlated. The model estimates a correlation coefficient ρ that indicates to what extend
unobservables in the selection equation correlate with unobservables in the outcome equation.
6 Results
Table 3 reports the results from our first three OLS regression models.11 The coefficient
measuring the effect of Executive Power-Sharing on the level of corruption is negative and
statistically significant in model 1. This supports Hypothesis 1. Power-sharing arrangements in
the national executive are likely to increase corruption in a post-conflict country. In terms of
substantive effects, the existence of executive power-sharing in a post-conflict country reduces
the Control of Corruption scale by 0.17, on a scale that ranges from -1.8 to 0.6 with a standard
deviation of 0.41.12
The effect of power-sharing on corruption is estimated while we control for the shares of
natural resources and the country’s foreign aid income relative to its GDP—that is, the two
main government income sources which can be easily captured by government elites. While
both variables point in a negative direction, only Natural Resource Wealth is also statistically
significant. With a one percent increase in Natural Resource Wealth relative to GDP, the Control
of Corruption scale decreases by 0.14. Apparently, higher levels of natural resource wealth also
substantially increase corruption in a post-conflict country, in line with existing findings on
the “resource curse” (Ross, 2015, p. 249). Of our control variables, only GDP Per Capita is a
positive and statistically significant predictor of the level of corruption in model 1 and model
3. However, we caution against overinterpreting the substantive effects of control variables
which are only intended to isolate our key relationship of interest.
Models 2 and 3 assess the interactive relationships between power-sharing and natural
11The statistical analysis was performed with Stata Statistical Software Version 14.2 (StataCorp, 2015).
12The effect size of Executive Power-Sharing and all other statistically significant predictors remains roughly the
same in the alternative specifications of our models presented below.
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Table 3. OLS Regression
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Executive Power-Sharing −0.17∗ 0.03 −0.06
(0.09) (0.16) (0.16)
Natural Resource Wealth (ln) −0.13∗∗ −0.11∗∗ −0.13∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Executive PS * Natural Resource Wealth −0.09∗
(0.05)
Foreign Aid Income (ln) 0.02 0.02 0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Executive PS * Foreign Aid Income 0.05
(0.06)
GDP Per Capita (ln) 0.08∗ 0.08 0.08∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Polity2 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.20 0.20 0.20
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
Population (ln) 0.00 0.01 −0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Constant −1.14 −1.26∗ −1.12
(0.69) (0.71) (0.69)
Observations 171 171 171
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.17 0.16
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
resource wealth and foreign aid income summarized in Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3. Before
discussing our results in greater detail, it is important to point out that the coefficients of the
interaction terms as well as their constitutive terms should not be used for any meaningful in-
terpretation. Berry, Golder, and Milton (2012) and Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006) explain
that the magnitude, direction or statistical significance of the coefficients of interaction terms
can be misleading. As a matter of fact, a statistically significant interactive relationship is often
only present at particular values of its constitutive terms. Assessing the statistical significance
of coefficients will not reveal this. The aforementioned scholars therefore recommend using
marginal effect plots to assess the presence of interactive relationships.
Following this advice, we plot the marginal effect of Executive Power-Sharing on Control of
Corruption at the full range of the values of Natural Resource Wealth and Foreign Aid Income.
The upper plot of Figure 2 shows that the interactive relationship between executive power-
sharing and natural resources is indeed negative. With increasing levels of Natural Resource
Wealth in a post-conflict country, the negative marginal effect of Executive Power-Sharing on
Control of Corruption increases. This effect becomes statistically significant when Natural
Resource Wealth is at 2.2 and the upper bound of the confidence interval falls below zero. At
this point, the point estimate of the marginal effect of Executive Power-Sharing on Control of
Corruption is -0.17 and it further decreases to -0.38 once the Natural Resource Wealth measure
has reached its maximum value in our sample. The underlying histogram in our plot also
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(a) Interaction Between Executive Power-Sharing and Natural Resource Wealth
(b) Interaction Between Executive Power-Sharing and Foreign Aid Income
Figure 2. Marginal Effects of Executive Power-Sharing on Control of Corruption at Different
Levels of Non-Tax Government Income
Note: Dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. The underlying histogram depicts the distribution of
observations of the variable on the x-axis in the sample.
17
reveals that this statistically significant interactive relationship applies to a sizable proportion
of the observations in our sample. Almost 53 per cent of all observations have a Natural
Resource Wealth score of 2.2 or more. This finding lends empirical support to Hypothesis 2.13
Substantively, this means that executive power-sharing has a negative effect on corruption
if the natural resource rents share of a post-conflict country’s GDP is greater than approximately
8 percent. Such a share of resource rents in a country’s GDP is roughly equivalent to the size
of Cote d’Ivoire’s natural resource rent income in 2005. This indicates that the negative effect
of power-sharing kicks in even at relatively low levels of natural resource dependency. At high
levels of resource income, the effect of power-sharing becomes much more pernicious: at 68
percent of GDP in natural resource rents—roughly equivalent to Liberia’s resource income
levels in 2003—the coefficient for the effect of cabinet level power-sharing becomes more than
twice the size of the coefficient in the main model. It appears that executive power-sharing
in countries where government income is heavily based on natural resources substantially
intensifies the corrupt scramble for such windfall resources.
The opposite is true for the interactive relationship between executive power-sharing and
foreign aid income. The lower plot in Figure 2 shows that the marginal effect of Executive
Power-Sharing on Control of Corruption increases when Foreign Aid Income increases. That
is, power-sharing in the national government is affiliated with lower levels of corruption
when the international community invests heavily in a post-conflict country. Except for the
Foreign Aid Income scores that are between -4 and -2.4, however, the confidence interval of the
estimated marginal effect covers positive as well as negative values rendering the marginal
effect statistically insignificant. Within this small stretch of values, the marginal effect of
Foreign Aid Income on Control of Corruption increases from -0.26 to -0.18. But the logarithmic
values of -4 and 2.4 on the Foreign Aid Income range only correspond to an increase in the
real world foreign aid share of a post-conflict country’s GDP from 0.004 to 0.1. Altogether,
therefore, we do not find empirical support for Hypothesis 3.14
13In this particular case, the interaction term in model 2 is actually also statistically significant. Regarding its
constitutive elements, it is important to remember that they only measure the effect of each coefficient conditional
on the other constitutive term being “0” (Brambor et al., 2006). In the case of model 2, this means that the
coefficient of Executive Power-Sharing only measures the effect of executive power-sharing if Natural Resource
Wealth is “0.” This applies to 19 observations in our sample. Interestingly, Natural Resource Wealth still exerts a
negative effect on our dependent variable Control of Corruption in model 2. That is, post-conflict countries with a
larger share of natural resource wealth relative to GDP are also more likely to be more corrupt when there is no
executive power-sharing.
14Turning to the constitutive elements of this interactive relationship, it needs to be stressed again that the
coefficient of Executive Power-Sharing only measures the effect of executive power-sharing if Foreign Aid Income
is “0.” There is no instance where Foreign Aid Income equals “0.” The coefficient of Executive Power-Sharing in
model 3 is therefore meaningless. As explained previously, the interpretation of our non-tax government income
coefficients is restricted to those cases where Executive Power-Sharing is “0.” Foreign Aid Income remains statistically
insignificant in model 3.
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6.1 Alternative Model Specifications
We also consider alternative model specifications to explore the robustness of our findings. In
particular, we investigate the concept validity of our dependent variable and explore the effect
of alternative determinants of corruption.15
Data on corruption is notoriously difficult to come by and fraught with data quality issues
(for a recent review, see Heywood and Rose, 2014). As we have explained in the data section,
the WGI measure Control of Corruption is the best choice for the present analysis. Nevertheless,
it is worth exploring whether the limitations of this measure bias our findings. First, we turn to
the possibility that the Control of Corruption measure is not independent of our key explanatory
variable, Executive Power-Sharing. The WGI measure captures perceptions of the extent to
which public power is exercised for private gain at the end of a given year. Our Executive
Power-Sharing measure, in contrast, records the average number of rebel-held seats over the
entire year. If power-sharing indeed makes it more easier for elites to capture the state, the
Control of Corruption measure might code the presence of power-sharing over the course of a
year as an indicatorof higher levels of corruption. To ensure that our dependent variable is
measured independently from our central explanatory variable, we therefore run our models
with Executive Power-Sharing taking the value of “1” if in January of a given country-year at
least one cabinet post was given to rebels. In doing so, we create a temporal sequence between
Executive Power-Sharing and the yearly assessment provided by the WGI measure of corruption.
Importantly, our empirical findings are not affected by this alternative version of Executive
Power-Sharing (see Table 2 and Figure 1 in our Online Appendix).
Next, scholars emphasize that year-to-year changes in the WGI measure might not nec-
essarily indicate systematic change due to external drivers of corruption (Kaufmann et al.,
2010; Heywood & Rose, 2014). Yearly changes in Control of Corruption can also be caused by
changes in the underlying data sources and how these individual sources are aggregated. To
account for this possibility, we estimate our models using year fixed effects. We thereby greatly
reduce the chance that any statistical relationships are driven by a year-specific “shock” as, for
example, the inclusion of a previously unused data source measuring corruption. The results
of OLS regressions with year fixed effects do not differ substantially from the main findings
presented above (see Table 3 and Figure 2 in the appendix).
As a final test of the concept validity of our dependent variable, we estimate our regression
models using an alternative measure of corruption: the corruption scale of the International
Country Risk Guide (PRS Group, 2015).16 The ICRG Corruption measure provides quarterly
assessments of the level of corruption within a country.17 The measure denotes very high levels
15Our Online Appendix presents the results of our robustness checks in greater detail.
16We use the replication dataset from Hegre and Nygård (2015) to conduct this robustness check.
17The ICRG Corruption score is “a measure of corruption within the political system that is a threat to foreign
investment by distorting the economic and financial environment, reducing the efficiency of government and
business by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather than ability, and introducing
inherent instability into the political process” (PRS Group, 2015).
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of corruption with 0 and then moves in 0.5 decimal steps up to 6 which indicates very low
levels of corruption. The ICRG data has more limited geographical coverage than the WGI
measures but provides annual measures from 1984 onwards and thus allows us to test our
hypotheses using a longer time-span.18 As in our main statistical analysis, we rely on OLS
with robust standard errors clustered on post-conflict countries.19 Again, the results of this
robustness check corroborate the findings our main analysis (see Table 4 and Figure 3 in the
appendix).
The omission of potentially influential independent variables from our regression models
constitutes another threat to the robustness of our findings. We therefore investigate whether
the estimated effects remain stable in terms of statistical significance and substantive effects
when we control for different context factors. Specifically, we control for non-linear effects of
regime type, an alternative fractionalization measure and additional power-sharing variables.
To begin with, the relationship between regime type and corruption might be nonlinear
affecting our hypothesized relationships between executive power-sharing, resources and
foreign aid on the one side and corruption on the other. When we include a squared term of
the Polity2 variable, our main results hold but it appears that corruption is indeed less likely in
more democratic and more autocratic countries (Table 5 and Figure 4 in the appendix). The
interactive relationships nevertheless hold whenthe for nonlinear effects of regime type are
controlled for. Next, we rerun our OLS regressions controlling for an alternative dimension of
a country’s societal fractionalization—that is, we replace the Ethnic Fractionalization measure
with a Religious Fractionalization score. Again, all our key findings hold and the Religious
Fractionalization score turns out not to be statistically significant (see Table 6 and Figure 5 in
our Online Appendix).
The next series of models controls for the establishment of additional power-sharing
institutions in a post-conflict country. While our theory hypothesizes that it is primarily
executive power-sharing which negatively affects the level of corruption in a post-conflict
country, there might still be the possibility that other common types of power-sharing exert
similar effects. We therefore include a binary variable that takes the value of “1” when a
territorial power-sharing arrangement granting autonomy or enacting regional devolution has
been passed by the national parliament. We also include a binary variable that takes the value
of “1” when an electoral law promising proportional representation has been passed. Both
variables keep the value “1” as long as the laws are active. The data comes from the PSED
(Ottmann & Vüllers, 2015). As with our other robustness checks, our empirical findings hold.
Moreover, neither the presence of territorial power-sharing nor the introduction of proportional
representation in the national legislature affect the dependent variable Control of Corruption
18We did not opt to use the PRS measure as our main dependent variable since it lacks data on a number of
countries that are of interest to us—for example, Afghanistan, Burundi or Nepal.
19While the ordinal nature of the ICRG Corruption measure would normally best be explored with ordinal logit
or probit models, past research has shown that OLS estimates of the ICRG data are reasonably close to those
obtained through ordinal logit or probit models (Treisman, 2007, p. 221). Moreover, using OLS instead of ordinal
logit/probit gives us a direct relationship between a one unit change in the independent variable and changes to
the dependent variable.
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(Table 7 and Figure 6 in the appendix).
Finally, we explore whether our estimation results continue to hold if we move beyond
the common practice in power-sharing research of only looking at the first five years of a
post-conflict period (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007; Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008; Walter, 2002). There
is the possibility that the effect of executive power-sharing on corruption disappears and other
factors gain importance if we consider longer post-conflict periods. We therefore estimate
our models using a sample with seven post-conflict years and ten post-conflict years. We also
include a variable measuring the number of years since executive power-sharing has ended
to account for time dependency. However, our key findings remain stable in this robustness
check as well (see Table 8 and Figure 7 in the appendix).
6.2 Addressing Endogeneity
To further increase confidence in a causal interpretation of the effect of power-sharing on
corruption, we also estimate a treatment effect model where we account for the endogenous
selection of power-sharing in post-conflict countries. The challenge of correctly estimating such
a selection model stems from the need to find an exogenous variable, the so-called “exclusion
restriction”. This exclusion restriction must be correlated with the treatment variable, but not
with the outcome variable.
We use two variables as exclusion restrictions: per cent of country territory in conflict
(Conflict Area) and power parity between rebel and government troops (Gov’t-Rebel Parity).
These two variables proxy the nature of government-rebel power relations in a civil war. Past
research (Gent, 2011) sees these power relations as a central determinant of the emergence
of power-sharing in post-conflict situations. The idea behind Conflict Area as an exclusion
restriction is that we expect power-sharing to become more likely when more territory is
engulfed by the conflict. A greater conflict area can be seen as a rough proxy for rebel success
on the battlefield: although the variable does not directly capture rebel territorial gains, a larger
conflict area nevertheless indicates a higher chance of loss for the incumbent regime because
it indicates that the government does not have full control over its state territory. Conversely,
if the conflict area is small, we should expect the chances of power-sharing to decrease since
the government will be more likely to expect to win the war, as it can concentrate its forces.
At the same time, Conflict Area is unlikely to be correlated with post-conflict corruption. It is a
conflict-level variable that captures the military strategy objectives of both parties and should
therefore be exogenous to the level of corruption.
We use the PRIO Conflict Site Dataset (Hallberg, 2012) to generate our Conflict Area
variable. The PRIO Conflict Site Dataset captures the “area of the conflict zone in square
kilometers” (Hallberg, 2011, p. 4). We divide this area by a country’s territorial size (taken from
the cshapes R package (Weidmann, Kuse, & Gleditsch, 2010) to generate a value between 0
and 1 that indicates the total territorial share of the conflict area. A first glance at the data
reveals that there is indeed a positive relationship between conflict area and power-sharing:
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Table 4. OLS Regression with Endogenous Treatment Effects
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
DV: Control of Corruption
Executive Power-Sharing −0.38∗∗ −0.27 −0.37∗
(0.16) (0.25) (0.22)
Natural Resource Wealth (ln) −0.13∗∗ −0.12∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Executive PS * Natural Resource Wealth −0.05
(0.06)
Foreign Aid Income (ln) 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Executive PS * Foreign Aid Income 0.00
(0.06)
GDP Per Capita (ln) 0.08 0.07 0.08
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Polity2 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.30 0.29 0.30
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
Population (ln) −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Constant −0.90 −0.97 −0.90
(0.66) (0.69) (0.66)
DV: Executive Power-Sharing
Natural Resource Wealth (ln) −0.33∗ −0.33∗ −0.33∗
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Foreign Aid Income (ln) −0.35∗∗ −0.35∗ −0.35∗∗
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
GDP Per Capita (ln) −0.27 −0.27 −0.27
(0.38) (0.38) (0.38)
Polity2 0.06 0.06 0.06
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Ethnic Fractionalization 3.46∗∗ 3.45∗∗ 3.46∗∗
(1.41) (1.41) (1.41)
Population (ln) −0.39∗ −0.39∗ −0.39∗
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
Gov’t-Rebel Parity 1.18∗∗ 1.19∗∗ 1.18∗∗
(0.51) (0.52) (0.51)
Conflict Area (ln) 0.44∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Peace Years 2.78∗ 2.76∗ 2.78∗
(1.46) (1.46) (1.47)
Peace Years (squared) −1.10∗∗ −1.09∗∗ −1.10∗∗
(0.53) (0.53) (0.54)
Peace Years (cubed) 0.12∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.12∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Constant 3.05 3.14 3.04
(4.03) (4.07) (4.03)
ρ 0.54∗∗ 0.50∗ 0.54∗∗
(0.27) (0.29) (0.27)
Observations 168 168 168
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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many countries with power-sharing arrangements—such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Nepal, or Liberia—all have Conflict Area scores above 0.5. The
relationship is not deterministic however. A number of countries—such as Azerbaijan, Haiti
or Mozambique—also have large Conflict Area values, but did not establish power-sharing
arrangements.
The second exclusion restriction we employ is the variable Gov’t-Rebel Parity. The idea
behind this variable is that power parity between rebels and government is a proxy for a
military stalemate between both parties which in turn makes power-sharing more likely. At the
same time, power parity is unlikely to be related to national post-conflict levels of corruption,
since it, too, is a conflict-level variable that captures the short-term tactical balance between
the adversaries. It is a dummy variable that captures whether rebels and government forces
are roughly equal in size or not. Data on government and rebel troop strength is taken from
the Non-State Actor Dataset (Cunningham, Gleditsch, & Salehyan, 2013).
Table 4 reports the results from our endogenous treatment models. Model 1 in Table 4
shows that the coefficient for Executive Power-Sharing is negative and statistically significant
from zero. This confirms our findings from the previous section. Interestingly, the coefficient
is more than twice as large as in the models without accounting for selection bias. This
means that if we account for the endogenous selection of power-sharing, the effect of power-
sharing on corruption becomes even more pronounced. And selection indeed seems to be
an issue: both Conflict Area and Gov’t-Rebel Parity are positive and statistically significant
predictors of implemented executive power-sharing in the selection equation. Also, the
correlation coefficient ρ between the error terms of the selection and the outcome equation
is 0.54 and statistically significant. This means that unobservables in the selection model
are systematically correlated with unobservables in the outcome equation. Models 2 and 3
replicate the previous models with interaction between Executive Power-Sharing and Natural
Resource Wealth and Foreign Aid Income, respectively. Although the coefficient of the interaction
term is not statistically significant, marginal effects plots reveal that there are meaningful areas
of statistically significant interaction between Executive Power-Sharing and Natural Resource
Wealth roughly in line with the marginal effects estimated in our simple OLS regression (see
Figure 8 in our Online Appendix). Thus, even if we account econometrically for systematic
selection, power-sharing leads to more corruption at higher levels of natural resource income.
7 Discussion
Do power-sharing institutions drive corruption in the aftermath of civil war? Viewed through
the lens of political economy theory, power-sharing institutions offer rent-seeking elites an
opportunity to access rents from state resources. In addition, many rebel elites may feel—now
that they can access state revenues—that they are entitled to privately compensate themselves
and their supporters for the perceived injustices they suffered during the conflict. Further, since
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elites within the power-sharing arrangement cannot be certain that they will be represented
in the post-transitional political order, they have strong incentives to capture as many state
resources as possible. As a consequence, power-sharing institutions increase a post-conflict
country’s level of corruption. Evidence from a range of statistical models provides support
for this hypothesis: post-conflict countries with power-sharing exhibit a higher degree of
corruption as compared to post-conflict countries without this institutional arrangement in
place. Also, this relationship depends on the resources available to the elites within the power-
sharing cabinet. In a context of natural resource abundance, the corruption-inducing effect of
power-sharing becomes stronger.
The findings presented here open up important avenues for further inquiry. As our main
focus was to establish the link between power-sharing and corruption as an indicator for
elites’ rent-seeking behavior, we have not analyzed whether it is indeed the economic function
of power-sharing institutions that drives their success in upholding peace after violent civil
conflict. We are confident that future studies that try to disentangle the complicated relationship
between power-sharing and peace would benefit from including the political economy of this
institutional arrangement in their theoretical and empirical models.
Another key avenue for further research is the relationship between power-sharing govern-
ments and accountability. While we have controlled for the quality of democratic institutions
to isolate the independent effect of executive power-sharing on corruption from broader ac-
countability factors, future research should explicitly incorporate democratic accountability
into its theoretical and empirical models of power-sharing governments and further explore its
implications. Norris (2008) has already discussed how constitutional power-sharing mecha-
nisms (e.g., parliamentarism, proportional representation electoral systems, and federalism)
are capable of improving democracy. Our findings indicate that it is also important to analyze
how the political economy of executive power-sharing arrangements affects the quality of
democratic accountability in post-conflict countries. In this regard, a promising avenue for
future research might be the investigation of the patron-client relationships between elites
in power-sharing governments and their constituencies and their impact on conceptions of
vertical accountability between elites and citizens, citizen engagement, and the public respon-
siveness of the post-conflict state—particularly once the interim period of power-sharing ends.
Ultimately, such research has the potential to contribute to existing debates in development
studies on how to improve and promote the voice of citizens in post-conflict countries (Fox,
2015).
Our findings are also relevant to the policy and academic debate about power-sharing and
the effects of corruption on post-conflict peacebuilding (Transparency International, 2014;
Working Group on Corruption and Security, 2014). The qualitative literature has long promoted
a nuanced view of corruption in post-conflict situations (Cheng & Zaum, 2013). On the one
hand, some argue that corruption can have a stabilizing effect in post-conflict situations:
“[Corruption] can be used in the short term to craft a peace where the spoils of war are divided
amongst the fighting factions; in some cases, it may be the only way to provide the stability
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needed to achieve other peacebuilding objectives” (Cheng & Zaum, 2013, 22f). However,
corruption also undermines economic development and thus reduces economic peace dividends
for large parts of the population. If post-conflict elites divert public resources, both from aid
and from natural resources, into their own pockets, post-conflict development is hampered.
Yet this view has largely been based on qualitative and anecdotal case study evidence. Using
novel data on power-sharing and rebel participation in post-conflict governance, we show
that this pattern is generalizable to a wider set of post-conflict countries. Further, while the
level of corruption is generally higher in post-conflict countries than in other countries, our
statistical results suggest that it is the institution of power-sharing that particularly drives
political corruption in the aftermath of civil conflicts. Policy-makers and academics should
therefore be cautious when promoting power-sharing as go-to solution for terminating civil
conflicts: while it may offer the possibility to buy off former opponents in the short term
and thus stabilize volatile post-conflict situations, power-sharing might undermine economic
development and peacebuilding in the long run by institutionalizing corruption.
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